In the Netherlands, conservative forces strongly opposed the Linggadjati agreement. The Commissioner General appeared to have “ceded” the Dutch East Indies to an irresponsible and unreliable group of Indonesian nationalists. The Dutch government has decided to amend and interpret the agreement to ensure that the Netherlands has adequate future influence in Indonesia. The Dutch Minister for the Overseas Territories, J. A. Jonkman (1891-1976), made a statement to Parliament, simply citing the Linggadjati Agreement as a basis for further discussions and reaffirming Dutch ambitions abroad. The Social Democratic Party and the Catholic Party proposed a motion that made it clear that the future United States of Indonesia would be part of a Sovereign Dutch-Indonesian Union. Parliament adopted this motion, by which the Netherlands definitively reinterpreted the Linggadjati agreement – without changing the exact wording of the agreement itself. Both sides were not satisfied with the agreement, and a member and two advisers of the General Commission resigned in protest after it was signed. The Dutch were not satisfied with the fact that the Republic established external relations, including the Arab League, and that Indonesia maintained governors in the region that had become the state of Eastern Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesians have complained about the founding of Dutch states in eastern Indonesia and western Borneo.   The Dutch public received the agreement in a mixed manner – a survey showed that 38% of respondents supported the agreement and 36% opposed it.
A telegram to members of the Dutch parliament compared the Linggadjati agreement to the Dutch capitulation to Germany in 1940 and asked why the agreement “extradited seventy million Indonesians to Sukarno.”  Both sides began filing charges and counterclaims for violations of the ceasefire agreement. The cases of Indonesian violations, as accused by the Dutch, are numerous, but for the purposes of this memorandum are not listed here. However, recent telegrams from The Hague and Batavia have reported Dutch actions that are not aimed at creating maximum harmony in future negotiations and, if continued, could have serious consequences for the outcome of the agreement. Batavia Telegram No. 108 of 5. February (Tab l)2 refers to reports from The Hague suggesting that the department may not be entirely behind Dr. Graham. Such reports could undermine the influence of the U.S. delegation in Indonesia. In addition, the Dutch have shown reluctance to have additional British and Australian military observers in Indonesia. These observers are needed to help implement the ceasefire agreement. More serious, however, is the report by US military observers in Indonesia that Dutch forces in Rawagedeh were involved in large-scale killings (Batavia Telegram No.
28, January 8, Tab 2) and the more recent report, which is still not confirmed (Batavia Telegram No. 107, February 5, Tab 3), according to which the Dutch armed forces retaliated for the sabotage of railways by machine guns on residents. of two villages. The former British ambassador to Egypt, Lord Killearn, acted as a mediator in the early stages, but it was not necessary as the two sides established good relations.  Both sides initialled the draft agreement on 15 November.  On June 29, van Mook wrote to Sukarno to reiterate the main points he felt needed to agree, including the maintenance of Dutch sovereignty and the common police. The new Prime Minister Amir Sjariffuddin accepted the Dutch authority de jure, but refused to accept the joint police. The Dutch also demanded an end to republican hostilities and a food blockade of Dutch-controlled areas before midnight on July 16. The Republicans agreed to a ceasefire, even though the Dutch were bound by it. The Indonesian side also proposed arbitration under Article 17 of the Agreement.
On July 20, however, the Dutch terminated the Linggadjati Agreement and, on van Mook`s recommendation, Dutch Prime Minister Louis Beel ordered the army to launch a military intervention. It started on the night of July 20-21 in the form of Operation Product.   After three months in Indonesia, the Security Council`s Good Offices Committee reached a ceasefire agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Netherlands. As an integral part of the agreement, the two sides accepted six principles proposed to them by the Good Offices Committee as the basis for a lasting political settlement in Indonesia. These principles are as follows: The Linggadjati Agreement was adopted by a Dutch delegation and representatives of the Republic of Indonesia on 12 September. It was agreed in 1946 at the Linggadjati mountain resort near Ceribon on Java. The agreement was signed on 25 March 1947 in Batavia(Jakarta). The main content of the agreement was that the Netherlands recognized the republic as a de facto authority in Java (including Madura) and Sumatra. The two governments should cooperate in the formation of a sovereign, democratic and federal United States of Indonesia covering all the territories of the Dutch East Indies, including the Republic of Indonesia, Kalimantan (Borneo) and the Greater East. The two governments are expected to work with the Queen of the Netherlands at the helm to establish a Dutch-Indonesian union.
The United States of Indonesia and the Dutch-Indonesian Union were to be established by 1 January 1949. The two governments have agreed to settle any dispute that may arise that they cannot resolve themselves by arbitration. The agreement should establish general principles so that the details can be worked out at a later stage. However, each side interpreted the agreement according to its interests, and eventually an open conflict developed between the Dutch and Indonesian governments. The agreement reached represents an important achievement of the Security Council in a difficult and rapidly deteriorating situation so far. Without the Good Offices Committee, it seems highly unlikely that the parties will have reached a ceasefire agreement or a political solution; indeed, it is not unlikely that the Republic of Indonesia will soon have been eliminated as a political factor in the Dutch East Indies. However, it can be said that the regulation is largely favourable to the Dutch and, as such, represents several important compromises on the part of the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic accepted a demarcation line recognizing Dutch military progress following the Security Council armistice order of 1 August 1947. It also recognized as a fait accompli the establishment of new States in areas formerly under the jurisdiction of the Republic, established under the auspices of the Netherlands during the ongoing negotiations with the Committee on Good Offices. (2) The Secretary stresses that the principles agreed upon by the parties are consistent with the policy of that Government, both individually and as a member of the United Nations, that the settlement reached so far by the United Nations apparatus [page 94] is fully supported by that Government in the Security Council, and that that Government also supports it before the Security Council as a united achievement of nations […].