After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Bonn Agreement laid the groundwork for state reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, supported by the United States and NATO. The agreement aimed to create a new constitution, an independent judiciary, free and fair elections, a centralized sector of security and the protection of the rights of women, including minorities, such as religious and ethnic groups. This model of state-building in Afghanistan was based on a “maximumist model of post-conflict reconstruction” that emerged in the 1990s as a result of international interventions in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and East Timor.  In December 2001, 25 prominent Afghans, under the aegis of the United Nations, met in Bonn to adopt a plan for the country`s leadership (see list of signatories to the International Conference on Afghanistan, Bonn (2001)). The invitation of the warlords, capable of disrupting the process of state-building, introduced a “big tent” strategy to involve these non-state actors in the centralization of the Afghan state instead of alienating them.  As a result, the 30-member Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), under the leadership of a President, was inaugurated on 22 December 2001 for a six-month term, followed by a two-year transitional authority (TA), after the elections. The Bonn Agreement (officially the agreement on interim arrangements in Afghanistan until permanent government institutions were restored) was the first set of agreements adopted on 5 December 2001 to restore the State of Afghanistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the absence of a national government since 1979 in Afghanistan, it was deemed necessary to have a transition period before a permanent government was established. A nationally agreed government would require the convening of at least one jirga de loya; However, in the absence of law and order following the rapid victory of the armed forces of the North American and Afghan alliance, immediate action was taken to prove necessary. One section of the Bonn Agreement provided for the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  UN Security Council Resolution 1386 then created ISAF. The Bonn agreement calls for the establishment of a judicial commission to rebuild the judicial system in accordance with Islamic principles, international norms, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions. The roadmap for state-building, established by the Bonn Agreement, was an inappropriate model for the case of Afghanistan and subsequently led to a number of issues, including corruption and government incompetence.
As the Bonn agreement does not provide for shared powers within the Afghan government, it has encouraged an internal war between two of the country`s “elite networks”, the Northern Alliance and the Pashtun group. As a result, the Northern Alliance held most ministerial positions in the Afghan government and had a great deal of decision-making capacity. This insensity of political power and abundant internal rivalries were noted in an early World Bank report, which said: “Even within the central government, the current political divisions and rivalries make it impossible to reach a reasonable consensus on even the most important political elements of a broad programme of administrative reforms…  The subsequent failures of the Afghan state, including the inability to provide basic social and security services, are the result of the “overvolunted reconstruction model” put in place by the Bonn Agreement and practical challenges on the ground.  As a result of this event, the Afghan government adopted a more informal style in public affairs of the implementation of the pact and mediation.